P.F.Strawson INDIVIDUALS pp.103-116
Kaori ISAKA
Part
I 3. PERSONS
[5]
The logical character of a fundamental class of Personal predicates.
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1 The logical primitiveness of the
concept of a person
When one ascribes one’s own states of consciousness,
or experiences, to anything, one also ascribes, or is ready and can ascribe,
states of consciousness, or experiences, to other individual entities of the
same logical type as that thing to which one ascribes one’s own states of consciousness.
Two kinds of predicates are applied to the
individuals concerned. The first kind of predicate consists of those which are
also properly applied to material bodies. Strawson calls this first kind
M-predicates. They include things like “weighs 10 stone”, “is in the
drawing-room” and so on. The second kind consists of all the other predicates
we apply to persons. He calls these P-predicates. They include things like “is
smiling”, “is going for a walk”, as well as “is in pain”, “is thinking hard”, “believes
in God” and so on.
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2 The concept of a person is the concept
of a type of entity that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and
predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics, a physical situation etc. are
equally applicable to an individual entity of that type. The concept is
primitive only in the meaning that we cannot think of it as a secondary kind of
entity in relation to two primary kinds, namely, a particular consciousness and
a particular human body.
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3 P-predicates in general
P-predicates imply the possession of
consciousness on the part of that to which they are ascribed.
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4 The character of P-predicates
As regards identifiable individuals of a special
type, namely, such that they possess both M-predicates and P-predicates, there
is in principle some way of telling, with regard to any individual of that
type, and any P-predicates, whether that individual possesses that P-predicate.
And, when one ascribes states of consciousness to oneself, or at all, the ascriber
already knows how to ascribe at least some states of consciousness to others.
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5 Strawson claims that the conclusion of
paragraph 4 follows from a consideration of the conditions necessary for any
ascription of states of consciousness to anything.
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6 But, there remain many cases in which
one has an entirely adequate basis for ascribing a P-predicates to oneself, and
yet in which this basis is quite distinct from those on which one ascribes the
predicate to another. For example, one says, reporting a present state of mind
or feeling, “I feel tired, I am depressed, I am in pain”.
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7 The essential character of
P-predicates
P-predicates have both first- and
third-person ascriptive uses. They are both self-ascribable otherwise than on
the basis of observation of the behavior of the subject of them, and
other-ascribable on the basis of behavior criteria.
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8 The concept of depression
X’s depression is something, one and the same
thing, which is felt, but not observed, by X, and observed, but not felt, by
others than X.
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9 When we take the self-ascriptive
aspect of the use of some P-predicates, say “depressed”, as primary, then a
logical gap seems to open between the criteria on the strength of which we say
that another is depressed, and actual state of being depressed. If the logical
gap exists, then depressed behavior, however much there is of it, is no more
than a sign of depression.
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10 When we take the other-ascriptive
uses of these predicates as primary or self-sufficient, we have forgot the
self- ascriptive use of these predicates, and forgot that we have to do with a
class of predicates to the meaning of which it is essential that they should be
both self-ascribable and other-ascribable to the same individual.
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11 The language in which we ascribe
P-predicates
The criteria on the strength of which we
ascribe P-predicates to others give not all the ascriptive meaning of these
predicates. If so, we forget that they are P-predicates, forget the rest of the
language-structure to which they belong.
[6]
The central importance of predicates ascribing actions. The idea of a “group
mind”.
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1 Our perplexities
“How are P-predicates possible?” or “How is
the concept of a person possible?” This is the question by which Strawson
replaces those two earlier questions, namely, “Why are states of consciousness
ascribed at all, ascribed to anything?” and “Why are they ascribed to the very
same thing as certain corporeal characteristics?”
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2 A certain class of P-predicates imply
intention or a state of mind or at least consciousness in general, and indicate
a characteristic pattern, or range of patterns, of bodily movement, while they
don’t indicate at all precisely any very definite sensation or experience.
Strawson means such things as “going for a walk”, “coiling a rope”, “playing
ball”, “writing a letter”. We can know about them without observation or
inference.
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3 What Strawson suggests
If we think first of the fact that we act,
and act on each other, and act in accordance with a common human nature, it is
easier to understand how we can see each other, and ourselves, as persons.
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4 The idea of a special kind of social
world in which the concept of an individual person is replaced by that of a
group
For example, Strawson thinks of two groups of
human beings engaged in some competitive, but corporate activity, such as
battle. While absorbed in such activity, the members of the groups make no
reference to individual persons at all. They do, however, refer to the groups.
They may in fact use in such circumstances the plural forms “we” and “they”,
but they are plurals without a singular.
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5 A condition for the existence of the
concept of an individual person
It sometimes happens, with groups of human
beings, that their members think, feel and act “as one”.
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6 In the one case we think of a
particular member as the spokesman of the group. In the other case we think of
him as its mouth, that is, think of the group as a single scattered body. As
soon as we adopt the latter way of thinking, then we abandon the former.
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Disembodiment
We think one’s disembodiment strictly, in
order to retain his idea of himself as an individual, he must always think of
himself as disembodied, as a former person. He must live in the memories of the
past personal life he did lead. As the memories fade, his concept of himself as
an individual becomes attenuated.